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ABSTRACT
This paper documents the importance of studying the indirect effects
of OSHA and EPA regulations ——thecompetitive advantages which arise from
the asymmetrical distributions of regulatory impact among different types
of firms. We argue that if the competitive advantage gained through in-
direct effects is sufficiently large, it can more than offset any direct
costs producing a net benefit for the regulated firm and its workers. The
indirect effects of OSHA and EPA regulations arise in two ways. The first
source is compliance asymmetries, whereby one firm suffers a greater cost
burden even when regulations are evenly enforced across firms. The second
source is enforcement asymmetry, whereby regulations are more vigorously
enforced against certain firms. Earlier research shows that these asymme-
tries do exist and are based on firm size, unionization, and regional loca-
tion. In this paper we empirically document that the indirect effects pro-
duced by these asymmetries mitigate the direct costs of regulations for many
firms. Large, unionized firms in the Frostbelt are clearly gaining wealth
at the expense of small, nonunionized firms in the Sunbelt.
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A common error in popular expressions of political economy is the
presumption that all firms oppose environmental and safety regulations
because these edicts raise business costs. The flaw in this presumption
arises from an exclusive focus on what we will call the "direct effects"
of regulation --theisolated, partial equilibrium impacts of regulation
on single firms or individuals.' Examples of the direct effects of
environmental and safety regulations include increased safety of products
and workplaces, decreased emissions of pollutants, and increased manufac-
turing costs. While direct effects dominate popular perceptions of
regulation, the often pronounced heterogeneity among firms gives rise to
additional, general equilibrium impacts we will call "indirect effects"
--thecompetitive advantages which arise from the asymmetrical distribu-
tions of regulatory impact among different groups of firms and workers.
For example, if the cost burden of certain regulations falls heavily on
one group of firms and lightly on a second group, then an indirect effect
of these regulations is to provide cost advantage to the second group of
firms. It is extremely important to recognize that for many firms and
workers the indirect effects of regulation can outweigh, in terms of
economic importance, the direct effects. If the competitive advantage
gained through indirect effects is sufficiently large, it can more than
offset any direct costs, producing a net benefit for the regulated firm
and its workers. The CPSC swimming pooi slide standard, new source
'For a more extensive discussion of the direct and indirect effects
of regulation, see Bartel and Thomas (1985).2
standards of the Clean Air Act, and the OSHA cotton dust standard are
among the many regulations where indirect effects have been shown to
predominate.2
As Salop (1981) and others have pointed out, activities which raise
rivals' costs are, in fact, predatory in many circumstances. The three
conditions necessary for activities to be regarded as predation are:
competitor damage, predator benefit, and consumer damage. The first
condition, competitor damage, is very likely to be satisfied by OSHA and
EPA regulations. The national cost of industrial compliance with these
regulations was $3.7 billion for OSHA and $7.7 billion for EPA in 1976
(Weidenbaum and DeFina, 1978) and mounting evidence (discussed below)
indicates that this cost burden is asymmetrically distributed among
various types of firms.3 As regards the second condition, predator
benefit, particular groups of firms may well be sufficiently advantaged
from indirect effects of regulation to experience increased profits (or
wages, or both). The question of whether certain firms actually benefit
from EPA and OSIIA regulations is an empirical issue, and is the focus of
this paper. Herein, we econometrically estimate the nature and extent of
regulatory impact on industry wages and profits in the manufacturing
sector of the U.S. economy.
In a narrow sense, the third condition for predation, consumer
damage, is also extremely likely to be satisfied by EPA and OSHAregula-
the CPSC, see Viscusi (1984); on EPA, see Crandall (1983); and
on OSHA, see Haloney and McCormick (1982).
3As Salop and Scheffman (1983) note, there are economic conditions
under which these regulatory cost burdens need not damage competitors.
Competitor damage is thus an empirical issue.3
tions. The cost increases and productivity decreases of these regula-
tions raise prices for immediate consumers and reduce consumer surplus.4
From a broader, and probably more correct perspective, however, for U.S.
environmental and workplace safety regulations to entail "consumer
damage,tt these regulations would need to fail a broad test of social
cost-benefit. No such tests of the overall impact of these regulations
is attempted in this paper, and thus in a strict sense, our argument that
these regulations are predatory is incomplete. Nonetheless, a wide range
of recent studies of OSHA and EPA have concluded that the actual benefits
of these regulations are quite limited.5'6
In the next section, we discuss the impact of indirect effects of
regulation on profits and wages and show how the first two conditions for
predation, competitor damage and predator benefit, may be satisfied by
the enforcement of OSHA and EPA regulations. Section III describes the
empirical specifications and data sources used to test the hypotheses
regarding indirect effects. The results presented in Section IV document
the transfer of wealth between firms that occurs through the enforcement
of OSHA and EPA regulations. Conclusions appear in Section V.
4Salop and Scheffrin also argue that there are some cases where in
fact consumer surplus may rise after rivals' costs are raised.
50n OSHA, see DiPietro (1976), Mendeloff (1976), Smith (1976),
Viscusi (1979), and Bartel and Thomas (1985). On EPA, see Lave and Omenn
(1981) and Crandall (1983).
6Consumer damage is usually the most problematic of the three
conditions. For example, the recently dismissed antitrust case against
IBM contained several controversial allegations of predation against the
computer company. Perhaps an appropriate view is that EPA and OSHA are
at least as predatory as IBN and other industrial corporations.4
II. Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation
Indirect effects of regulation arise from two possible sources:: a
"compliance asymmetry" whereby one firmsuffersa greater cost burden per
unit of output even when regulations are equally enforced across firms,
or an "enforcement asymmetry" whereby regulations are more vigorously
enforced against certain firms. There appear to be three principal
sources of compliance asymmetries due to environmental and safety
regulations. First, to the extent that there are economies of scale in
compliance, then smaller firms suffer a larger unit-cost impact and in
fact may be sufficiently disadvantaged as to exit the industry.
Pashigian (1984) has provided evidence of economies of scale in compli-
ance with EPA regulations, Neumann and Nelson (1982) have documented the
exit of small mines resulting from enforcement of the 1969 Coal 1ine
Health and Safety Act, and we have previously documented the strong
economies of scale that occur in manufacturing for compliance with OSHA
regulations (Bartel and Thomas, 1985). Second, to the extent that
unionized firms exhibit higher pre—regulation safety levels, enforcement
of occupational safety regulations can benefit unionized firms by forcing
non-union competitors to match union-dictated safety levels. Regulation
can thus reduce competitive pressure on unionized firms and workers,
transferring wealth to these firms and workers from the non-unionized
segment of the industry. Third, both because their plants tend to be
older and smaller, firms located in Northern and Midwestern states (the
Frostbelt) will tend to have higher compliance costs with OSHA and EPA
regulations than firms in Southern and Western States (the Sunbelt), when
these regulations are evenly enforced.5
The second source of indirect effects, enforcement asymmetries,
arises from administration of environmental and safety regulations that
are systematically skewed against particular groups of firms or workers,
and thus induce (or aggravate) competitive advantage for these particular
groups. As regards OSHA, our own earlier study (Bartel and Thomas, 1985)
exposed more intensive enforcement (per worker) against small and non-
union firms by the agency. To test for regional enforcement asymmetries
by OSHA, we reran regression analyses from our earlier study now includ-
ing a variable measuring industrial regional location. These new results
are reported in an appendix to this essay and confirm that OSHA enforce-
ment is more intensive against Sunbelt firms. As regards EPA, the
environmental regulations themselves are notoriously riddled with en-
forcement asymmetries. Especially significant are requirements that new
plants meet tighter standards than old plants, and that plants in areas
of the country that are cleaner than national standards must meet tighter
standards than plants in dirty areas (Crandall, 1983). Both these
enforcement asymmetries burden Sunbelt plants, raising their costs
against their Frostbelt counterparts.
Compliance and enforcement asymmetries are thus probably reinforcing
in the case of plant size and workforce unionization, with large and
unionized plants favored. These asymmetries are, however, offsetting as
regards regional impact. Note that if regional enforcement asymmetries
are pronounced enough to dominate regional compliance asymmetries, then
Frostbelt firms will be advantaged through regulation.
The impact of EPA and OSHA on industry total rents may thus be
positive or negative. In terms of direct effects alone, the impacts are,
of course, negative --higherregulation-induced production costs6
generally lower potentialrents.7 But if these regulations sufficiently
disadvantage small, nonunion, or Sunbelt firms in the industry, then the
increase in the industry price that results from the upward shift in the
supply curve, may more than offset the regulatory costs for large,
unionized, or Frostbeltfirms.8 Hence, rents for the industry may
actually increase, on average. Figure 1 shows how the impact of regula-
tion on industry rents depends on the firm size distribution in the
industry. (Similar diagrams would hold for the percent workforce union-
ized or for the percent Frostbelt workforce distributions.) It can be
seen in Figure 1 that the effects of EPA and OSHA regulations on indus-
trial rents will be most negative for industries comprised exclusively of
small firms. As average firm size increases, indirect effects become
more significant and the effects of regulation on rents become less
negative. Finally, for industries with the largest firms, regulation may
well increase total and average industry rents through the exclusion of
fringe competitors.
It is important to realize that the impact of regulation on industry
rents will be shared between wages and profits because much of the
potential increase in windfall profits through regulatory predation may
be expropriated by workers. Salinger (1984) has documented this transfer
to unionized workers for cross-sectional industry profits, and Moore
7Gray (1984) focused on direct effects when he studied the impact of
OS}IA and EPA on productivity.
81n other words, the rents of marginal firms will decline and some
may be forced to exit, while the rents of inframarginal firms will rise.
For an extended discussion, see Salop and Scheffman (1983).7
(1978) and others have documented the abilities of unions to force
artificially increased wages for regulated firms enjoying windfall
profits. Ignoring wages and examining only corporate profits would
potentially severely understate the extent of regulatory impact. Our
analysis, therefore, considers the impact of regulation on both profits
and wages.
To measure the impact of direct and indirect effects of regulation,
we specify the following relationship:
(1) II. =c+a..R.+aR.•S. ÷ cUR. •U. ÷ a.R. •F. +X. -- 1 U11 Zi 1ii 141i 1
where =profitsin industry i
=regulatorycompliance costs in industry i
S. average firm size in industry i
U percent of workers unionized in industry i
=percentof workers in Frostbelt in industry i
X =avector of other variables that affect profits
A similar equation may be specified for industry wages. The direct
effects of regulation are captured by parameter c, and this parameter is
expected to be negative. A significant negative estimate for is
sufficient to demonstrate competitor damage by regulation for at least
some firms. Indirect effects of regulation are captured by parameters
2'
and and these parameters are expected to be positive. Note
that if the magnitudes of cr2, a3, and are large enough, then some
firms and workers will enjoy increased wages and profits as a result of
EPA and OSHA regulations, and predator benefit will also be documented.
In the next section of this paper, we specify equation (1) more fully,







Notes: Regulation increases economies of scale for the
industry; average cost curve moves from solid line
to dotted line.
For industries comprised predominantly of small
firms (dotted line), the profit impact is negative
on average. For industries comprised predominantly
of large firms (solid line), the profit impact may
be positive on average. See text for discussion.
/
/9
III. Empirical Specifications and Data Sources
A. Introduction
The sections above have shown how regulation can cause transfers of
wealth among rivals in an industry. In our empirical analysis we esti-
mate the impact of OSHA and EPA regulations on the wealth of workers and
firms in three-digit SIC manufacturing industries during the time period
1974-78.
B. Dependent Variables
The wage variable is measured by the average compensation in the
industry (wages plus fringes/number of employees) and is obtained from
the Annual Survey of Manufacturers.
The profit variable is "return on assets" defined as value added
less labor costs, all divided by the value of assets, which is the value
of structures and machines. This is also calculated from the Annual
Survey of Manufacturers. While the industry's "return on assets" is a
good proxy for the industry's profits, it suffers several well-known
drawbacks. In spite of these problems this measure is used because of
its ready availability at a level of aggregation that exactly matches the
9mis time period is chosen because of limited availability of key
variables outside the mid-70s. See Bartel and Thomas (1985) for a
complete explanation.10




Critical to our analysis is the appropriate method of measuring OSHA
and EPA regulations. In order to document how OSIIA and EPA affect
industry rents, we need, in each case, a variable that captures the costs
imposed on each industry by regulation. In the case of OSHA, data on the
actual costs of compliance are very limited. Between 1973 and 1980,
McGraw-Hill did conduct a survey of capital expenditures related to
worker safety and health but the survey only covered 16 broad industry
sectors in manufacturing. As a better alternative, we proxy compliance
costs by the dollar value of penalties assessed against the industry by
OS11A. These data are collected by OSHA and are available for detailed
industry classifications.
The OSHA penalty data have two important restrictions. First, they
only refer to violations of safety standards; penalties associated with
violations of health standards are deleted from the data. Because safety
violations constitute about 90% of total penalties, this restriction is
not severe. Second, the OSHA data used for this study are restricted to
the 22 states where workplace safety regulations have been continuously
enforced by OSHA during the 1970s.11 Under provisions of the OSHAct of
1970, states may retain responsibility for the development and enforce-
ment of OSHA standards. In 1979, 64% of inspections and 25% of penalties
10Freeman (1983) used this measure of profits to study the impact of
unionism on profitability.
11Those states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas and West Virginia.11
were generated by state agencies. Because detailed state data were not
available for study, we use only data on federal enforcement of OSHA
standards.
To examine the impact of OSHA on workers' wages, we divide the
penalty variable by the number of workers in the 22 states for the
industry and create PENENPL; the number of workers is estimated from the
Census Bureau's Country Business Patterns tapes. When the dependent
variable is the return on assets, the denominator of the OSHA variable is
changed to the value of assets (PENAST). Since in this case the numera-
tor uses data based on 22 states while the denominator uses national
data, we multiply PENAST by the ratio of the number of employees in the
nation to the number in the 22 states, in effect, expanding the numerator
to a national basis.
For EPA, a good measure of compliance costs is available. Each
year, the Census Bureau publishes, for each SIC category, gross pollution
abatement operating costs, which cover solid waste collection and dispos-
al, depreciation, labor, equipment leasing, materials and supplies, and
payments to governments for public sewage use.'2 Pashigian (1984) has
shown that most of the pollution abatement operating costs incurred from
1974 to 1978 can be considered incremental, i.e., induced by the regula-
tory program. For our analysis of workers' wages, we define a variable
PACEMPL which equals gross pollution abatement operating costs in the
12Unfortunately, establishments in SIC Group 23, Apparel and other
Textile Products; are excluded from the Census Bureau's Pollution Abate-
ment Expenditures survey because, according to the Census Bureau, these
establishments operate primarily in rented quarters where the abatement
of pollution is generally arranged by the landlord. Hence, we deleted
establishments in that SIC category from our analysis.12
industry divided by the number of workers in the industry using national
data; for analysis of return on assets, we change the denominator to the
value of assets and create PACAST.
Finally, we interact each of the four regulation variables (PENENPL,
PACEMPL, PENAST, PACAST) with average firm size, percent unionized
employees in the industry, and percentage of employment in the Frostbelt
in order to capture the indirect effects of regulation, or wealth trans-
fers among various firms in the industry. Average "firm" size is calcu-
lated from the County Business Patterns data, and, is really establish-
ment size, although we refer to it as firm size. The union variable is
Freeman and I1edoff's (1979) measure of percent of workers covered by
collective bargaining agreements, based on the Expenditures for Employee
Compensation (EEC) surveys. We chose this measure for two reasons;
first, collective bargaining coverage is the most relevant concept for
analysis of the impact of unionization in the labor market and second, it
is the only measure available on a 3-digit SIC basis, as opposed to the
Census industrial classification. The Frostbelt is defined to include
states in the Northeast and Nidwest; the percentage of each industry's
employment in these areas is calculated from the County Business Patterns
tapes.
According to the discussion in Part II, while each of the four
simple regulation variables should have a negative sign, each of the
twelve interaction terms should have a positive sign since regulation is
presumed to benefit large firms' unionized firms, and those firms located
in the Frostbelt.13
D. Other Independent Variables
The wage equation includes the following additional variables.
First, we use a set of variables describing the workers in the industry:
average education (EDUC), average age and its square (AGE and AGESQ),
percentage of production workers (PROD), percentage of male workers
(MALE), and the new-hire rate (N}LR). EDUC, AGE and AGESQ are obtained
from the current Population Survey; the other variables are from the
Employment and Earnings files of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Second,
we add average firm size (FSIZE), the union variable (UNION), and their
squares (FSSQ and UNSQ). Third, we allow for the impact of market
structure by using the four-firm concentration ratio (CONC) which is
obtained from the 1977 Census of Manufacturers. Following Long and Link
(1983), we also interact CONC with UNION. Fourth, we consider the effect
of production demand in the industry by using average overtime hours
(OVER) and the percentage change in shipments during the previous year
(SHPDIF). OVER is from Employment and Earnings and SHPDIF is calculated
from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. Finally, we add a regional
control, SOUTH, which is the percentage of the industry s employment that
is located in the south (calculated from the County Business Patterns
tapes), and we add four year dummies (D75, D76, D77, and D78).
The return on assets equation includes the following additional
variables. First, we include a set of variables that measure those
expenses that have not already been deducted from totalrevenues.'3
These are advertising per unit of assets (ADVERT), which is obtained from
13As the numerator is defined, only payroll and the cost of
materials have been deducted.14
the Internal Revenue Service Corporate Source Book, research and develop-
ment per unit of assets (RANDD) which is obtained from Scherer (1984),
the value of inventories per unit of assets (INV), and new capital
expenditures per unit of assets (CAPEXP); the latter are from the ASN.
Second, average firm size (FS1ZE), the union variable (UNION) and their
squares (FSSQ and UNSQ) are added. Third, the concentration ratio is
used because of the widely hypothesized relationship between concentra-
tion and profitability. Fourth, past output growth (SHPDIF) and cost of
materials growth (MATDIF) are used. The latter is used to test for the
impact of increases in fuel and energy costs. Finally, following Weiss
(1972) we test for the role of geographic dispersion by using GIIERF, a
Herfindahl index of employmentacrossstates, based on the County Busi-
ness Patterns data. A set of year dummies is also used.
III. Results
A. Estimation Technique
The workers' wealth and return on assets equations are each estimat-
ed by nonlinear least squares and are specified as follows:














where PACEMPL and PENEMPL are our measures of EPA and OSHA as described
in the previous section, FSIZE is average firm size, UNION is percentage
of employees unionized, FROST =percentageof employment in the Frost-
belt, PAC/PENthe ratio of pollution abatement operating costs to
OS11A penalties, and X is a vector of other variables in the wage equa-
tion.






wherePACAST and PENAST are the appropriate measures of EPA and OSHA
regulation as described in the previous section and Z is a vector of
other variables in the ROA equation. According to these specifications,
five regulation parameters are estimated for each dependent variable;
- and2 5 capture the effect of OSHA while and adjust
these parameters for the differential effect of EPA. The reults of
estimating equations (2) and (3) are reported in Tables 1 and 2,
respectively.
B. The Effects of Regulation
In column 1 of each table, we begin •the analysis by exc1uding the
regulation-interaction terms. This enables us to show the estimated
impacts of OSI-LA and EPA when the role of indirect effects is ignored.It
can be observed that, in this case, OSHA and EPA regulations have a weak16
positive effect on wages and a negative and significant effect on return
on assets. In column 2 of each table, we allow for the existence of
indirect effects caused by the compliance and enforcement asymmetries we
discussed in Section II. Recall that our model predicted that the
largest firms, the most heavily unionized firms, and those firms in the
Frostbelt would gain competitive advantage from the enforcement of OSHA
and EPA regulations. In column 2 of Table 1, we now observe that the
"pure" effect of regulation on wages, the coefficient on PENENPL, has
become negative arid significant while the interaction termswithfirm
size,unionization and Frostbelt (PENSIZE, PENUNION and PENFROST) are all
positive and significant.14 This means that, in industries comprised
almost exclusively of small, nonunionized firms in the Sunbelt, OSHA and
EPA regulations have a significant negative effect on workers' wealth,
while in industries with many large, unionized firms in the Frostbelt,
the regulations significantly increase workers' wealth. In other words,
the wealth of workers in large, unionized firms in the Frostbelt rises
due to the competitive advantage gained from regulatory predation against
their small, nonunionized, Sunbelt rivals. Such predation is accom-
plished by a combination of compliance and enforcement asymmetries as
discussed earlier, but the relative contribution of each type of asymme-
tryisimpossible to determine within the context of this study.
14Note that quadratic terms on firm size and percent unionized are
included in all of our equations. These are added to insure that the
regulation interaction terms do not capture possible nonlinearities in
the effects of firm size and unionization on wages.17
Table 1
Dependent Variable: Average Compensation of Workers
1 2 3
Independent
Variable t t t
PAC/PEN (a1) .564 (1.43) .616 (3.99) .633 (3.74)
PENENPL (a2) 1.15 (1.47) -12.39 (—5.82) -11.83 (-4.94)
PENSIZE (a ) .0345 (3.81) .0253 (1.19)
PENSIZE2 .00003 (.49)
PENIJNION (a4) .0917 (2.91) .0904 (2.88)
PENFROST (a..) .1526 (7.57) .1514 (7.47)
UNION -.0314 (-.49) .0110 (.18) .0110 (.18)
UNSQ .0018 (2.56) .0001 (.19) .0001 (.18)
CONC 9.56 (1.99) 8.87 (1.96) 8.79 (1.94)
CONIJNION .0488 (.55) .1097 (1.31) .1136 (1.35)
FSIZE .0623 (4.56) .0754 (5.58) .0791 (5.08)
FSSQ -.0001 (-2.07) -.0001 (—3.76) -.0001 (-3.18)
PROD -52.71 (-12.09) -47.97 (—11.54) -48.12 (-11.55)
MALE 51.14 (15.85) 53.95 (17.67) 53.90 (17.64)
EDUC 3.30 (5.94) 3.04 (5.81) 3.02 (5.76)
AGE 7.81 (2.73) 6.12 (2.27) 6.27 (2.31)
AGESQ -.0974 (-2.64) —.0773 (—2.21) -.0793 (—2.25)
NItR —.3843 (-10.81) -.3397 (-10.05) -.3407 (-10.05)
OVER .1869 (4.43) .2782 (6.83) .2792 (6.84)
SOUTH —1.01 (—2.49) —13.18 (—8.06 -13.09 (—7.97)
SHPDIF 10.81 (2.59) 9.58 (2.45) 9.63 (2.46)
D75 -1.86 (—1.34) -1.36 (-1.05) -1.38 (—1.05)
D76 1.36 (1.07) 1.41 (1.19) 1.40 (1.18)
D77 5.01 (3.95) 4.62 (3.88) 4.62 (3.88)
D78 6.45 (5.05) 5.43 (4.53) 5.42 (4.53)
Constant -61.01 (-1.08) -23.58 (-.44) -26.30 (-.49)
R2 .864 .882 .882
N 606 606 606
Key to Variables:
PAC/PEN =ratioof pollution abatement operating costs to OSHA penalties;
PENEMPL =OSHApenalties per employee; PENSIZE =PENEMPLaverage firm
size; PENSIZE2 =PENEMPL*thesquare of average firm size; PENUNION
PENENPL *percentunionized; PENFROST =PENEMPL*FROST,UNION =percent
unionized; TJ}TSQ =UNION*UNION;CONC =four-firmconcentration ratio;
CON1JNION =CONC'UNION;FSIZE =averagefirm size; FSS2 =FSIZE*FSIZE;
PROD =percentproduction workers; MALEpercent male employees;
EDUC =averageeducation of workers; AGE =averageage of workers;
AGESQ =AGE*AGE;NHR new hire rate; OVER =averageweekly overtime
hours; SOUTH =shareof employment in the South; SHPDIF =annualgrowth
in shipments; D751 if 1975; D76 =1if 1976; D771 if 1977; D78 1
if 1978.Table 2
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets
2 3
Key to Variables:
PAC/PEN =ratioof pollution abatement operating costs to OSHA penalties;
PENAST =OSHApenalties divided by value of assets; PENASTEF =
PENAST*averagefirm size; PENASTEF2PENAST *thesquare of average
firm size; PENASTUN =PENAST*percentunionized; PENASTFR =PENAST*FROST;
FSIZEaverage firm size; UNION =percentunionized; FSSQFSIZEFSIZE;
UNSQ =UNION*UNION;CAPASTcapital expenditures divided by value of
assets; INVAST = valueof inventories divided by value of assets;
RDAST =expenditureson R&D divided by value of assets; ADVAST =
advertisingexpenditures divided by value of assets; CONC =four-firm
concentration ratio; SHPDIF =annualchange in value of shipments;
MATDIF =annualchange in materials costs; SOUTH =shareof employment
in the South; GHERF =geographicHerfindahl index; D75 =1if 1975;















































FSSQ .000002 (1.84) .000001 (1.41) .000003 (2.39)
UNION -.0087 (-4.34) —.0113 (—5.44) -.0117 (-5.61)
TJNSQ .0001 (4.60) .0001 (4.03) .0001 (4.23)
CAPAST .9711 (2.23) .8223 (1.92) .7656 (1.78)
INVAST .5154 (11.85) .5046 (12.14) .5044 (12.22)
RDAST -1.79 (-.84) -3.31 (-1.52) -2.75 (-1.26)
ADVAST 4.68 (16.87) 4.40 (15.92) 4.43 (16.05)
CONC -.1747 (-1.79) —.0628 (-.63) -.0869 (-.86)
SHPDIF 1.14 (3.47) 1.05 (3.23) 1.06 (3.27)
MATDIF -.6274 (-2.14) —.5151 (-1.78) -.5304 (-1.84)
SOUTH -.0067 (-.54). —.2813 (—3.87) -.2758 (-3.84)
GHERF .0139 (2.48) .0197 (3.54) .0202 (3.63)
D75 -.0459 (—1.06) -.0492( -1.16) -.0505 (-1.19)
D76 .0040 (.10) .0063 (.16) .0065 (.16)
D77 .0054 (.14) .0073 (.19) .0031 (.08)
D78 .0067 (-.54) .0014 (.04) —.0022 (- .05)
Constant .017 (.11) .159 (1.03) .216 (1.37)
R2 .649 .666 .668
N 582 582 58219
In column 2 of Table 2, we add the regulation-interaction effects to
the returns on assets equation.'5 We find strong evidence that unionized
firms gain wealth relative to nonunionized firms as a result of the
enforcement of OS11A and EPA. Additionally, firms in the Frostbelt
benefit relative to those in the Sunbelt, and the effect is very signifi-
cant. The hypothesized firm size effect, although of the right sign, is
extremely weak. In column (3) we consider whether this is due to the
hypothesized economies of scale dissipating at very large firm sizes.
ml..: L.._ ._s.t__ _s.s —— nrvr*nmrr'nt.r _t iU..L uuiie uy auu.Lug dUULUtL .LuLeracLluuLerlU, r.a1L.rL, wriicu equais
PENAST*(FSIZE)2. According to the results in column(3),PENASTEF is now
positive, while PENASTEF2 is negative and each is significant at the 10
percent level.16 Economies of scale disappear at an establishment size
of 205. This corresponds to the ninetieth percentile of the establish-
ment size distribution in our sample. Hence, our argument that indus-
tries with many large firms experience an increase in wealth relative to
industries dominated by small firms, as a result of OSHA and EPA regula-
tion, holds true, but the effect dies out very promptly as firm size
increases. In contrast, when PENSIZE2 was comparably added to the wage
equation, no diminution of the firm size effect was found as firm size
increased.
15Again, note that quadratic terms on firm size and unionization are
included in these equations. See footnote 15.
16Note that in column (3) of Table 1, we also included an
interaction term with the square of firm size, PENSIZE2, but this vari-
able was not significant.20
C. Other Variables
The regressions in Tables 1 and 2 contain other variables that were
used to properly specify the employee compensation and return on assets
equations. Since the effects of these variables are not our focus and
other researchers have thoroughly discussed their impacts, we do not
discuss them in detail here. The effects of the variables in the
employee compensation equation are all consistent with previous research
17
and there are no surprises here. In the return on assets equation, one
result is unexpected, namely that R&D does not have a positive effect.
This clearly disputes other research and may be due to the imperfect
matching of the R&D data with the Survey of 1anufacturers data. We are
confident, however, that this does not contaminate the estimation of the
coefficients on the regulation variables. When we restricted the coeffi-
cient on RDAST to be positive, the coefficients on all of the regulation
variables, both simple and interaction terms, increased in the absolute
values of both magnitude and significance.
V. Conclusions
This paper has documented the importance of studying the indirect
effects of OSHA and EPA regulations --thecompetitive advantages which
arise from the asymmetrical distributions of regulatory impact among
different types of firms. We have argued that if the competitive advan-
tage gained through indirect effects is sufficiently large, it can more
17me insignificant effect of UNION Is due to the inclusion of IJNSQ.
When UNSQ is deleted, UNION is positive and significant in all columns of
Table 1.21
than offset any direct costs producing a net benefit for the regulated
firm and its workers. The indirect effects of OSIiA and EPA regulations
arise in two ways. The first source is compliance asymmetries, whereby
one firm suffers a greater cost burden even when regulations are evenly
enforced across firms. The second source is enforcement asymmetry,
whereby regulations are more vigorously enforced against certain finns.
Earlier research has shown that these asymmetries do exist and are
based on firm size, unionization, and regional location. In this paper,
we have empirically documented that the indirect effects produced by
these asymmetries mitigate the direct costs of regulation for many firms.
Large, unionized firms in the Frostbelt are clearly gaining wealth at the
expense of small, nonunionized firms in the Sunbelt. While the estimated
regulation-interaction effects were significant in Tables 1 and 2, the
t-values by themselves do not indicate the magnitude of the wealth
transfer. We show this in Table 3 where we evaluate the derivatives of
regulation in both the wage and profit equations. The effect is estimat-
ed by letting firm size, unionization and the Frostbelt employment share
each take on, in turn, a value of zero, the mean, the median or the
maximum, while the other two variables are set to equal to their means.
This exercise enables us to determine the relative importance of the
indirect effects created by each of the variables. The findings in Table
3 show that workers in large, unionized firms in industries that have a
high Frostbelt employment share benefit substantially. The Frostbelt
effect is the largest of the three tested here; evaluating its effect
from minimum to maximum values of FROST at mean values of PENEMPL and
WAGE we find a 5.4% increase in wages. According to the profit equation,
firms in heavily unionized Frostbelt industries also profit from OSHA and22
EPA regulation; the comparable effect of FROST on ROA is an 8.7% increase
18 . . .
fromminimum to maximummedium-sized firms, but dissipates beyond this
level. Another surprising result here is that the union effect is the
strongest of the three variables; evaluating its effect, we find a 12.8%
increase in ROA from minimum to maximum values of UNION. One interpre-
tation of why the wages and profits results differ is that workers may be
able to expropriate the bulk of the windfall wealth that is created by
regulation, and hence, relatively weak firm size effects are observed in
the case of profits. Alternatively, we feel that the unusual results
from the profit equation (e.g. weak firm size effect, very large union
effect) are due to admittedly inferior profit data. The difficulties in
measuring profits are well known, and, in our case, our profit measures
probably includes a number of expenses for which we have been unable to
control. Hence, we would argue that the wealth transfer inferred from
the profit equation is subject to potential measurement error, and the
results from the wage equation might be given more attention.
With this caveat in mind, we feel that our findings are extremely
provocative. We have shown that regulation has become a predatory device
that can be utilized to enhance the wealth of those firms that are best
able to comply and to reduce the wealth of rivals who suffer higher
regulatory cost burdens. Discussions about regulatory reform or deregu-
lation obviously need to incorporate this model of regulation in order to
accurately evaluate the impact of any proposed changes.
'8The mean ofwage is 101.9 in 1972 dollars. The mean of ROA is
.8706, which is so large because of several corporate expenses (including
capital costs, advertising, research, etc.) that are not deducted from
the numerator but rather are controlled for by independent variables.
The mean of PENEMPL is .382 and of PENAST is .344.Table 3
Estimated Total Effects of Regulation on Wages and Profits*
Wage Equation
Derivative of Regulation: (from Column 2 in Table 1)























Derivative of Regulation: (from Column 3 in Table 2)





















*Derivatjve values are computed using either zero, mean, median, or
maximum values for the listed variable in each row and mean values for
the other two variables. Median values are 71.5 (FSIZE), 45 (UNION),
40.4 (FROST). Means are 110.6 (FSIZE), 44.3 (UNION), 42.9 (FROST).
Maximum values are 520.7 (FSIZE), 90 (UNION) and 94.3 (FROST).24
APPENDIX
Inthe absence of existing studies of regional enforcement asymme-
tries by OSI{A, we elected to reestimate regression equations from an
earlier study (Bartel & Thomas, 1985). Explanations of specification and
descriptions of data are contained in the 1985 study and are not repeated
here. One feature of the data should be noted, however. For reasons
discussed in the text of this essay, availability issues limited OSHA
enforcement data to a 22 state region of federal enforcement. Other data
used for the regression results below were comparably restricted to this
22 state region. Thus the variables listed below are different from
those used in the text as they are drawn from a different sample. The 22
states are as follows:
Frostbelt: Delaware, District of Columbia, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
and West Virginia
Sunbelt: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Texas.
Five enforcement variables were examined with OLS results reported
in Table 3. The Target Industry Program (TIP) was the focus of OSHA
enforcement activities in 1972 and 1973. The determinants of the OSHA
decision to include industries in the TIP are examined using data for
1974 only (earlier data for ESIZE and FROST limited to the 22 states were
not available). For 1974 to 1978, pooled cross-section time-series data
are used. Note that enforcement asymmetries against small, nonunion, and
Sunbelt firms are documented. Also note that enforcement asymmetries
against small firms basically disappeared by 1978, while regional en-
forcement asymmetries became more pronounced.Key to Variables
Table 4
Enforcement Asymmetries by OSHA
Dependent Variable
25
TIP =zero-onedummy variable (1974 only) for inclusion of industry in
TIP; INSPEMP =OSHAinspections per employee; LOSTDAY lost workdays per
employee; C1PLT =formalcomplaints to OSHA per employee; FSIZEaverage
establishment size; UNION =percentageof employees unionized; FROST =
percentageof employees in Frostbelt. YR =leftvariable is multiplied
by (year -1974);D74, etc. =zero-oneyear dummy variables.
Notes: All variables except TIP, Frost, and year dummies are in
logarithms.




LOSTDAY .155(8.69) .350 (9.77) .334
CMPLT —.012(-.92) .523 (19.52) .338
CMPLT*YR .115
FSIZE —.051(-4.85) -.322(-15.04) -.526
FSIZE*YR .113
UNION —.102(-6.18) —.080 (-2.40) -.066
LTNION*YR - .012
FROST -.200(-4.55) -.199 (-2.24) .017
FROST*YR - . 094
D74 1.291 (22.44) -.745
D75 1.217 (21.03) -.264
D76 .523 (9.65) -.416
D77 .205 (3.84) -.261
Constant -.379(-1.84) —3.184 (-7.65) -1.852
R2 .288 .746 .787

















Bartel, Ann P. and Lacy Glenn Thomas, "Direct and Indirect Effects of
Regulation: A New Look at OSHA's Impact," Journal of Law and
Economics, April 1985.
Crandall, Robert, Controlling Industrial Pollution: The Economics and
Politics of Clean Air, Washington, DC: Brookings, 1983.
DiPietro, Aldona, "An Analysis of the OSHA Inspection Program in
Manufacturing Industries 1972-1973," Draft Technical Analysis Paper,
U.S. Dept. of Labor, August 1976.
Freeman, Richard, "Unionism, Price-Cost Margins, and the Return to
Capital," NBER Working Paper No. 1164, July 1983.
Freeman, Richard and James Medoff, "New Estimates of Private Sector
Unionism in the United States," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review (January, 1979).
Gray, Wayne, "The Impact of OSHA and EPA Regulation on Productivity,"
NBER Working Paper NO. 1405, July 1984.
Robert Leone, Environmental Controls, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,
1976.
____________andJohn Jackson, "A Case Study of Water Pollution Controls
in the Pulp and Paper Industry," Harvard Business School working
paper 78-6.
Long, James and Albert Link, "The Impact of Market Structure on Wages,
Fringe Benefits, and Turnover," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review (January, 1983).
Maloney, Michael and Robert McCormick, "A Positive Theory of
Environmental Quality Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics,
April 1982.
Mendeloff, John, "An Evaluation of the OSHA Program's Effect on
Workplace Injury Rates: Evidence from California through 1974,"
Report prepared for ASPER, U.S. Dept. of Labor, July 1976.
Moore, Thomas Gale, "The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation," Journal
of Law and Economics, October 1978.
Neumann, George and Jon Nelson, "Safety Regulation and Firm Size:
Effects of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969," Journal
of Law and Economics (October, 1982).
Pashigian, Peter, "The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Optimal
Plant Size and Factor Shares," Journal of Law and Economics, April
1984.27
Salinger, Michael, "Tobin's q, Unionization and the Concentration-Profits
Relationship," Rand Journal of Economics, (Summer, 1984).
Salop, Steven, "Introduction," in Salop, ed., Strategy, Predation, and
Antitrust Analysis, Washington, D.C.: Federal Trade Commission,
1981.
__________andDavid Scheffman, "Raising Rivals' Costs," American
Economic Review (May, 1983).
Scherer, F. M., "Using Linked Patent and R&D Data to Measure Interindustry
Technology Flows," in Zvi Griliches, ed., R&D Patents, and
ductivity, University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Smith, Robert J., The Occupational Safety and Health Act: Its Goals and
Achievements, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1976.
Viscusi, W. Kip, Regulating Product Safety, American Enterprise
Institute, Washington, D.C., 1984.
__________"TheImpact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation,"
Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1979.
Weiss, Leonard, "The Geographic Size of Markets in Manufacturing,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, 1972.
Weidenbaum, Murray L. and Robert DeFina, "The Cost of Federal Regulation
of Economic Activity," AEI Reprint No. 88, May 1978.